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Artificial Intelligence and
Liability in Health Care
Frank Griffin†
Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) is revolutionizing medical care. Patients
with problems ranging from Alzheimer’s disease to heart attacks to
sepsis to diabetic eye problems are potentially benefiting from the
inclusion of AI in their medical care. AI is likely to play an everexpanding role in health care liability in the future. AI-enabled
electronic health records are already playing an increasing role in
medical malpractice cases. AI-enabled surgical robot lawsuits are also
on the rise. Understanding the liability implications of AI in the health
care system will help facilitate its incorporation and maximize the
potential patient benefits. This paper discusses the unique legal
implications of medical AI in existing products liability, medical
malpractice, and other law.
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Introduction
Robots armed with artificial intelligence (AI) will replace doctors
by 2035, according to at least one “legendary Silicon Valley investor,”
and in some cases, AI is already better than human doctors.1 Today,
for example, AI can (1) “look at brain scans of people who are exhibiting
memory loss and tell who will go on to develop full-blown Alzheimer’s
disease and who won’t,”2 (2) allow hospitals “to predict the likelihood
of a cardiac arrest in 70 percent of occasions, five minutes before the
event occurs,”3 and (3) save lives and speed hospital discharge by
improving treatment for “a deadly blood infection called sepsis.”4

1.

Bob Kocher & Zeke Emanuel, Will Robots Replace Drs.?, THE BROOKINGS
INST. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookingsschaeffer-on-health-policy/2019/03/05/will-robots-replace-doctors/
[https://perma.cc/5VT2-R2QW] (discussing, for example, a study
showing that “an artificial intelligence (AI) system was equal or better
than radiologists at reading mammograms for high risk cancer lesions
needing surgery[,]” that “computers are similar to ophthalmologists at
examining retinal images of diabetics[,]” and that “computer-controlled
robots performed intestinal surgery successfully on a pig[]” with “much
better” sutures than human surgeons).

2.

Daisy Yuhas, Doctors have trouble diagnosing Alzheimer’s. AI doesn’t,
NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/
doctors-have-trouble-diagnosing-alzheimer-s-ai-doesn-t-ncna815561
[https://perma.cc/6DJU-8S4B].

3.

David Shimabukuro, et al., Effect of machine learning-based severe sepsis
prediction algorithm on patient survival and hospital length of stay:
A randomised clinical trial, 4 BMJ OPEN RESP. RES. 1 (2017),
https://bmjopenrespres.bmj.com/content/4/1/e000234
[https://perma.cc/R54D-8QV4]. Sony Salzman, How hospitals are using
AI to save their sickest patients and curb alarm fatigue, NBC NEWS (July
27, 2019, 6:24 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/howhospitals-are-using-ai-save-their-sickest-patients-curb-ncna1032861
[https://perma.cc/V9K5-C33K].

4.

Id. (noting that in a 2016 study at the University of San Francisco, the
“death rate fell more than 12 percent” after the AI system was
implemented “meaning patients whose treatment involved the [AI] system
were 58 percent less likely to die in the ICU.” Further, the system sped
patients’ recoveries with AI monitored patients being “discharged from
the hospital an average of three days earlier than those who were
not.”); Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1.
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AI is being incorporated into health care worldwide.5 By 2030,
researchers predict that AI may affect up to 14% of global domestic
product with half of this effect coming from improvements in
productivity.6 AI will transform healthcare by “deriving new and
important insights from the vast amount of data generated during the
delivery of health care every day.”7 AI can quickly and cost-effectively
analyze previously unscalable data sets (like electronic health record
data, medical images, laboratory results, prescriptions, and
demographics) “to make predictions and recommend interventions” in
patient care.8 The United States “is investing heavily in developing AI”
as evidenced by the recent executive order from the White House
establishing the “American AI Initiative” to promote education and
apprenticeships in U.S. schools to support “the industries of the future
like . . . algorithms for disease diagnosis.”9
However, “AI is only as good as the humans programming it and
the system in which it operates.”10 Generally speaking, AI is defined as
computer technology designed to perform tasks like, or better than,
humans.11 AI mimics human intelligence using computer algorithms
5.

Thomas Maddox et al., Questions for A.I. in Health Care, 321 JAMA 31,
31 (2018) (stating, “Artificial intelligence (AI) is gaining high visibility in
the realm of health care innovation.”).

6.

Robert Challen et al., Artificial Intelligence, Bias and Clinical Safety,
28 BMJ QUAL. SAF. 231, 231 (2019).

7.

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING BASED
SOFTWARE
AS
A
MEDICAL
DEVICE
(SAMD) 2 (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/122535/download [https://perma.cc/DE9PC7XX].

8.

Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.

9.

Greg Kuhnen & Andrew Rebhan, Doctors beware: A robot doctor just
matched
humans’
diagnostic
performance, ADVISORY
BOARD,
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2019/02/13/ai-diagnosis
[https://perma.cc/9Q45-UM8A].

10.

Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.

11.

Maddox et al., supra note 5 at E1; PRAC. L. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH., PRACTICE NOTE: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE KEY LEGAL ISSUES:
OVERVIEW (2021), Westlaw w-018-1743, at 2 [hereinafter AI Key Legal
Issues] (stating that AI “generally refers to computer technology with the
ability to simulate human intelligence” by analyzing and learning from
data “to reach conclusions about it, find patterns, and predict future
behavior” leading to adaptations that help perform tasks better over
time); Sonoo Israni and Abraham Verghese, Humanizing Artificial
Intelligence, 321 JAMA 29, 29 (2019); Pavel Hamet & Johanne
Tremblay, Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 69 METABOLISM 536, 536
(2017) (“Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a general term that implies the use
of a computer to model intelligent behavior with minimal human
intervention” and “AI is generally accepted as having started with the
invention of robots,” and “The term [AI] is applicable to a broad range of
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that learn from existing data by incorporating statistics and
mathematics on a larger scale than generally possible for humans.12 An
algorithm is simply sets of computer software code with instructions for
the computer to perform certain tasks like recognizing patterns,
reaching a conclusion, or predicting future behavior.13
AI often involves humans “relinquishing control and entrusting
artificial intelligence to perform dangerous and complicated tasks”—
like driving an autonomous car or performing a complex surgical
maneuver.14 Examples of AI already being employed in health care
include broadly (1) virtual uses relying heavily on informatics like
machine learning (including artificial neural networks like those used
in image recognition technology and electronic health record algorithms
to improve diagnostic accuracy and clinical decision support), and (2)
physical uses like robotics employing machine perception/motion
manipulations.15 While there are other AI applications in use in health
care, this paper will focus on machine learning and on robotics as
representations of the virtual and physical branches of AI generally
being used in medicine.
AI is important in emerging medical law because new technologies
are one of the biggest drivers of liability risk.16 The American Medical
Association (AMA) passed its first policy recommendations for AI in
June 2018.17 One AMA board member noted that AI combined with
monitoring by “irreplaceable human clinician[s] can advance the
delivery of [health] care in a way that outperforms what either can do
alone,” but added that “challenges in the design, evaluation and

items in medicine such as robotics, medical diagnosis, medical statistics,
and human biology—up to and including today’s ‘omics’.”).
12.

Maddox et al., supra note 5; AI Key Legal Issues, supra note 11; see
also STEFAN A. MALLEN & THOMAS H. CASE, DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE
PRODS. LIAB. COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:39 NEED FOR STANDARDS IN
INDUS. USING A.I. (2018–19), Westlaw.

13.

AI Key Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 2 (defining algorithms as “sets of
code with instructions to perform specific tasks”).

14.

Madeline Roe, Who’s Driving That Car?: An Analysis of Regulatory and
Potential Liability Frameworks for Driverless Cars, 60 B.C. L. REV. 317,
337 (2019).

15.

AI Key Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 3 (“Machine learning . . . is AI
that learns from its past performance . . . .”).

16.

Gerke et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges of Artificial Intelligence-Driven
Healthcare, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
IN
HEALTHCARE 295 (June
26, 2020).

17.

Press Release, Am. Med. Assn., AMA passes first policy recommendation
on augmented intelligence (June 14, 2018) [hereinafter AMA Policy],
https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-passes-firstpolicy-recommendations-augmented-intelligence
[https://perma.cc/F9CR-HENC].
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implementation” must be addressed.18 The AMA’s policy recognizes the
potential legal issues—including liability risks—associated with the
rapid proliferation of AI use and pledges that the AMA will “[e]xplore
the legal implications of health care AI.”19
As recognized by the AMA, AI is likely to play a significant role in
health care liability cases in the future. Understanding the liability
implications of AI in health care is necessary to help facilitate its
incorporation into the health care system.20 This paper provides an
overview of the unique legal liability issues related to AI use in health
care.

I.

AI in Health Care

AI is being rapidly incorporated into health care. Healthcare AI
projects “attracted more investment than AI projects within any other
sector of the global economy.”21 Currently, “one-third of hospitals and
imaging centers report using artificial intelligence . . . to aid tasks
associated with patient care imaging or business operations.”22 The two
main branches of AI applications in medicine are physical and virtual.23
The physical branch includes surgical robots, which will be one focus of
this article.24 “The virtual branch includes informatics approaches from
deep learning information to control of health management systems,
including electronic health records, and active guidance of physicians in
their treatment decisions” (i.e., clinical decision support systems).25
A.

Surgical Robots

Surgical robots assist surgeons during surgical procedures in ways
that are “revolutioniz[ing]” medical care “by allowing surgeons to be
less invasive, work in smaller areas, and be more precise than when

18.

Id.

19.

Id. (emphasis added).

20.

Challen et al., supra note 6 (stating that AI’s “clinical value has not yet
been realised, hindered partly by . . . increasing concerns about
the . . . medico-legal impact.”).

21.

Varun H.
Buch, Irfan
Ahmed
& Mahiben Maruthappu, Artificial
Intelligence in Medicine: Current Trends and Future Possibilities,
68 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 143, 143 (2018).

22.

Jessica Kent, One Third of Orgs Use A.I. in Med. Imaging, Health IT
Analytics (Jan. 28, 2020), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/one-thirdof-orgs-use-artificial-intelligence-in-medicalimaging [https://perma.cc/8DED-SQSH].

23.

Hamet & Tremblay, supra note 11, at 537.

24.

Id. at 539.

25.

Id. at 536.
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performing the same surgery by hand.”26 “Minimally invasive surgery”
has been facilitated by surgical robots because the robots help surgeons
navigate around vital structures with less surgical dissection by creating
“safe zones” in the surgical field, by automating some functions like
shutoff of potentially dangerous surgical equipment as it nears vital
structures, and by helping the surgeon “see” where the instrument is in
space without requiring actual visual observation of the surgical
instrument.27
Robots guide the surgeon in three-dimensional space by tracking
the movements of the instruments during the procedure using sensors
(e.g., optical or electromagnetic)28 in the operating room.29 The
computer and robot alert the surgeon to the precise location and
orientation in space of the surgical instruments, which can provide vital
feedback regarding danger to surrounding structures and appropriate
placement and orientation of medical implants and devices.30
Many surgical robots use “haptics”—e.g., increased resistance to
movement at the borders of safe zones—to give the surgeon feedback
during surgery.31 If the surgeon using the robotic device deviates outside
the safe zone created by the preoperative surgical planning, the robot
provides haptic feedback to the surgeon in the form of tactile, auditory,
or visual alerts that warn the surgeon to the possibility of error.32 Such
robots define haptic boundaries for the surgical instruments that
constrain cutting tools within a specific working field, thereby
preventing injuries outside that field.33 Safety factors, such as push
back, are used when a haptic boundary is approached and shutting
down the surgical instrument may be employed when a haptic boundary
26.

Roe, supra note 14, at 328; see also Robotic Surgery, MAYO
CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/robotic-surgery/
about/pac-20394974 [https://perma.cc/G6KG-MNPJ ].

27.

Martin
Roche, Robotic-Assisted
Knee
Arthroplasty,
in 5
ORTHOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE
UPDATE:
HIP
AND
KNEE
RECONSTRUCTION 163, 163–65 (Michael A. Mont & Michael Tanzer eds.,
2017).

28.

See id. at 165–66.

29.

Id. at 167.

30.

Id. at 165.

31.

Bradford S. Waddell & Douglas E. Padgett, Computer Navigation and
Robotics in Total Hip Arthoplasty, in 5 ORTHOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE
UPDATE: HIP AND KNEE RECONSTRUCTION 423, 427 (Michael A. Mont &
Michael Tanzer eds., 2017).

32.

Id. (“Passive, or haptic, systems require surgical guidance: if deviation
beyond the boundaries created by the surgical plan occurs, tactile,
auditory, or visual feedback alerts the surgeon to the possibility of error.
Haptic systems allow the surgeon to ‘drive’ the robot, thereby allowing
surgeons to retain some element of control.”).

33.

Roche, supra note 27, at 165.
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is breached.34 Haptic feedback allows the surgeon to perform the
procedure without having to directly expose the surrounding tissues for
visualization, leading to smaller incisions and less unnecessary
dissection.35 For example, robot-assisted, minimally invasive orthopedic
surgery often “combines three-dimensional preoperative planning with
a precisely guided bone resection and implant placement.”36
Theoretically, robots can also be used to automate procedures such
that “[c]utting tools and instruments . . . controlled by the robotic arm,
with no need for surgeon control.” 37 However, fully-automated robotic
invasive surgical procedures (i.e., “active” robotics) are not currently
being performed in the U.S.38 Systems in use are either “semi-active”
such that the robot functions to augment the surgeon by controlling
surgical maneuvers by guiding and physically constraining the surgeon
within three-dimensional space or are “passive” such that the robot
positions the instrument but does not manipulate the patient or
constrain the surgeon.39
According to a recent report, the top five robotic surgery systems
are (1) da Vinci by Intuitive Surgical, (2) Ion by Intuitive Surgical, (3)
Mako by Stryker, (4) NAVIO by Smith Nephew, and (5) Monarch by
Auris Health.40 The first robotic surgery device to obtain FDA clearance
for general laparoscopic surgeries was the da Vinci Surgical System by
Intuitive Surgical.41 Surgical instruments and a camera are controlled
by the surgeon who operates using the “Surgeon Console.”42 Using the
da Vinci system, surgeons can perform operations using minimally
invasive techniques that previously required more extensive surgeries.43
Da Vinci is used in around 1,700 hospitals internationally, has been
used on more than 775,000 patients, and is now used in approximately
three fourths of U.S. prostate cancer operations.44 In addition, the

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Waddell & Padgett, supra note 31, at 427.

37.

Id.

38.

Roche, supra note 27, at 165.

39.

Id.

40.

Jack Carfagno, Top 5 Robotic Surgery Systems, DOCWIRE NEWS (May
15,
2019), https://www.docwirenews.com/future-of-medicine/top-5robotic-surgery-systems/ [https://perma.cc/49ZW-FSUA]

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.
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system is often used in “minimally invasive cardiac, colorectal,
gynecology, head and neck, thoracic, urology, and general surgeries.”45
Intuitive Surgical also has a robotic surgical system designed to
allow surgeons to perform lung biopsies using minimally invasive
techniques with a robotic catheter.46 The device, called Ion, was cleared
by the FDA’s 510(k) pathway in February 2019.47 Another lung device,
the Monarch System bronchoscopic device by Auris Health, uses a
“video game-like controller” during the procedure which the surgeon
uses to “navigate a flexible robotic endoscope throughout the branches
of the lungs.”48 The Monarch System offers the surgeon continuous
bronchoscopic vision, computer assisted guidance, and precise
instrument control; it was cleared via the FDA’s 510(k) pathway in
March 2018.49
Robotics are being used extensively in orthopedic surgery as well.50
Mako Surgical Corporation created the Mako System to allow
individualized positioning and minimally invasive approaches to partial
knee replacement, as well as total hip and knee replacement surgeries.51
The Mako System uses preoperative CT scans to “generate a 3D model
of the patient’s bone structure,” which is used to assist surgeons with
optimal implant placement for that particular patient.52 Stryker, a large
orthopedic device manufacturer, purchased Mako Surgical Corporation
for $1.65 billion, highlighting the money and focus on robotics in
orthopedics.53 Another big orthopedic company, Smith Nephew, has its
own robotic system called the NAVIO Surgical System to assist with
total knee replacement surgery.54 The NAVIO system relies upon
intraoperative bone mapping to generate a 3D model of the patient’s
bone structure and was approved by the FDA via the 510(k) pathway
in April 2018.55 The bone model is then used “by the surgeon to
virtually position the implant and balance tissues” before cutting the
bone.56 A robotically-assisted hand tool is used by the surgeon to guide

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

See Carfagno, supra note 40.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.
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the instruments during the procedure based upon the individualized
bone mapping model.57
B.

Machine Learning

Machine learning (ML) enables computers to “receive data and
learn for themselves” from “examples rather than a list of
instructions.”58 ML uses statistical methods that incorporate algorithms
to mimic human thought, “allowing computers to make predictions
from large amounts of patient data, by learning their own associations”
within the data.59 Using big health care data, “machine learning can
create algorithms that perform on par with human physicians.”60 ML
can “account for often unexpected predictor variables and interactions
and can facilitate recognition of predictors not previously described in
the literature” and not previously recognized by human researchers.61
ML comes in a spectrum that varies by the amount of human
oversight with some ML including more human specification of the
predictive algorithm’s properties while other ML requires less human
involvement such that the computer is allowed to learn the algorithm’s
properties by analyzing data.62 For instance, at one end of the spectrum,
human statisticians and clinical experts decide “which variables to
include in the model, the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables, and variable transformations and interactions.”63
When there is more human involvement, the algorithm is lower on the
machine learning spectrum.64
Deep learning is the most advanced part of the “machine learning
spectrum.”65 Deep learning “refers to a set of highly intensive
computational models”66 that “allow an algorithm to program itself by
learning from a large set of examples that demonstrate the desired

57.

Id.

58.

Using AI for social good, GOOGLE AI, https://ai.google/education/socialgood-guide/ [https://perma.cc/49A4-7DMD] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).

59.

Challen et al., supra note 6, at 231.

60.

Andrew L. Beam & Isaac S. Kohane, Big Data
in Health Care, 319 JAMA 1317, 1317 (2018).

61.

Ravi B. Parikh, et al., Machine Learning Approaches to Predict 6-Month
Mortality Among Patients with Cancer, 10 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 8
(2019).

and Machine Learning

62.

Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1317–18.

63.

Id. at 1317.

64.

Id. at 1317–18.

65.

Id. at 1317.

66.

Ricardo Miotto et al., Deep Learning for Healthcare: Rev., Opportunities
& Challenges, 19 BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 1236, 1241 (2018).
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behavior, removing the need [for humans] to specify rules explicitly.”67
When fewer assumptions are imposed by humans on the algorithm,
deep learning is approached, and the computer acts more autonomously
in decision-making.68 “Deep learning” has been used by technology
companies like Google and Facebook to analyze “big data” to “predict
how individuals search the internet, where they travel, what they like
to purchase, what is their favorite food, and who are their potential
friends.” 69
The “intellectual roots of ‘deep learning’” were planted in the 1940s
and 1950s with the development of “artificial neural network
algorithms” based loosely “on the way in which the brain’s web of
neurons adaptively becomes rewired in response to external stimuli to
perform learning and pattern recognition.”70 Deep learning models
involve “stunningly complex networks of artificial neurons” in multiple
layers of neural networks performing “highly intensive computational
models” designed to produce increasingly accurate models from raw
data.71 Deep learning can revolutionize health care by allowing doctors
to identify which patients may develop particular diseases, to identify
“which patients need to be seen more frequently,” to identify which
patients need to be “treated more aggressively,” and to determine the
most appropriate specific treatments (“i.e., precision medicine”).72
Two examples where deep learning is being applied today are
medical image analysis and clinical decision support.
1.

Medical Image Analysis

Medical images contain a large amount of complex data. Deep
learning is being applied to medical images and diagnosis in ways that
facilitate physicians’ decision-making process by providing support in
67.

Varun Gulshan et al., Development and Validation of a Deep Learning
Algorithm for Detection of Diabetic Retinopathy in Retinal Fundus
Photographs, 22 JAMA 2402, 2402 (2016).

68.

Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1317.

69.

Tien Yin Wong & Neil M. Bressler., Artificial Intelligence With Deep
Learning Technology Looks Into Diabetic Retinopathy Screening,
316 JAMA 2366, 2366 (2016).

70.

Andrew L. Beam & Isaac S. Kohane, Translating Artificial Intelligence
Into Clinical Care, 316 JAMA 2368, 2368 (2016) (internal quotation
marks
omitted);
see also Lawrence Carin & Michael Pencina,
On Deep Learning for Medical Image Analysis, 320 JAMA 1192, 1192
(2018) (“Successful neural networks for such tasks [as identifying natural
images of everyday life, classifying retinal pathology, selecting cellular
elements on pathological slides, and correctly identifying the spatial
orientation of chest radiographs] are typically composed of multiple
analysis layers; the term deep learning is also (synonymously) used to
describe this class of neural networks.”).

71.

Beam & Kohane, supra note 60; Miotto, supra note 66.

72.

Wong, supra note 69, at 2366.
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analyzing complex data sets like (1) clinical images, (2) radiology
images, and (3) pathology slides.
Deep learning is being applied to clinical image analysis. In one
example, researchers demonstrated “a deep learning algorithm capable
of detecting diabetic retinopathy . . . from retinal photographs at a
sensitivity equal to or greater than that of ophthalmologists.”73 The
algorithm learned “the diagnosis procedure directly from the raw pixels
of the images with no human intervention outside of a team of
ophthalmologists who annotated each image with the correct
diagnosis.”74 In another example, the photographs of skin lesions were
being analyzed by AI to diagnose skin cancers.75 Using this technology,
theoretically, a layperson could take the photograph and allow the
computer to review the image and report the diagnosis.
Similarly, deep learning is being used to analyze complex radiology
images and is being used for “diagnostic decision support . . . using
algorithms that learn to classify from training examples (i.e., supervised
learning).”76 A radiologist “typically views 4000 images in a CT scan of
multiple body parts (“pan scan”)” in polytrauma patients.77 Searching
for a hidden fracture in a pan scan can be like “searching for needles in
haystacks” leading to visual fatigue, which may make radiologists more
likely to fail.78
In contrast, deep learning learns as it analyzes more images and has
a “boundless capacity for learning.”79 Watson—IBM’s prototype for
AI—”can identify pulmonary embolism on CT and detect abnormal
wall motion on echocardiography.”80 With over 30 billion images
available to analyze, Watson “may become the equivalent of a general
radiologist with super-specialist skills in every domain.”81 For example,
AI algorithms “can look at brain scans of people who are exhibiting
memory loss and tell who will go on to develop full-blown Alzheimer’s
disease and who won’t,” which scientists believe will “accelerate the
discovery of therapies” to treat Alzheimer’s disease by identifying
“participants for drug or lifestyle interventions at the earliest stages of
dementia.”82
73.

Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1317.

74.

Id.

75.

Challen et al., supra note 6.

76.

Id.

77.

Saurabh Jha and Eric Topol, Adapting to A.I.: Radiologists and
Pathologists as Info. Specialists, 316 JAMA 2353, 2353 (2016).

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

Yuhas, supra note 2.
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Likewise, deep learning can be used in pathology. Deep learning can
be applied to “whole-slide pathology images” potentially improving
diagnostic accuracy and efficiency. 83 For example, for breast cancer
lymph node slides, “some deep learning algorithms achieved better
diagnostic performance than a panel of 11 pathologists.”84 The deep
learning algorithm produced results “comparable with an expert
pathologist interpreting whole-slide images without time constraints.”85
The usefulness in a clinical setting of this approach is being evaluated.
86
Another study showed that AI “could predict the grade and stage of
lung cancer” with “superior accuracy” compared to human
pathologists.87
2.

Clinical Decision Support

AI-enabled clinical decision support (CDS) systems are being used
by physicians to interpret large amounts of data in patients’ medical
records—like laboratory results, imaging studies, radiology reports,
EKGs, fitness tracker data, genetic testing, family history, medications,
hospital admission history, and countless other data points.88
Computerized alerts provided by CDS systems inside the patients’
electronic medical records (EMR) are already in widespread use and
offer health care providers “targeted and timely information that can
improve clinical decisions”89 and “reduce clinical error.”90 EMRincorporated CDS systems generally “sit quietly in the background of
the hospital’s computer systems, diligently tracking vital sign monitors
and then sending doctors a text message or other notification at the
first sign of trouble.”91 EMR-based CDS systems are having significant
“impact providing guidance on safe prescription of medicines, guideline
83.

Babak Ehteshami Bejnordi, et al., Diagnostic Assessment of Deep
Learning Algorithms
for Detection
of Lymph Node Metastases
in Women with Breast Cancer, 318 JAMA 2199, 2199 (2017).

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

Li-Qiang Zhou et al., Lymph Node Metastasis Prediction from Primary
Breast Cancer US Images Using Deep Learning, 294 RADIOLOGY 19, 19
(2020) (“Using US images from patients with primary breast cancer, deep
learning models can effectively predict clinically negative axillary lymph
node metastasis.”).

87.

Jha, supra note 77, at 2354.

88.

Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1318.

89.

Milena Gianfrancesco et
al., Potential Biasesin Machine Learning
Algorithms
Using Electronic
Health
Record
Data,
11 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 1544, 1545 (2019).

90.

Challen et al., supra note 6 (noting that CDS systems usually reduce
clinical error).

91.

Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1.
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adherence, [and] simple risk screening . . . .”92 In addition, CDS systems
“are being developed to provide other kinds of decision support, such
as providing risk predictions (eg, for sepsis) based on a multitude of
complex factors, or tailoring specific types of therapy to individuals.”93
For example, CDS systems can be used to individualize dosing of
medication and radiation treatments. Some systems try approaches to
“personalized treatment problems such as optimizing a heparin loading
regime to maximize time spent within the therapeutic range or
targeting blood glucose control in septic patients to minimize
mortality.”94 Similarly, for radiation dosing, “[s]ystems . . . can analyze
CT scans of a patient with cancer and by combining this data with
learning from previous patients, provide a radiation treatment
recommendation, tailored to that patient which aims to minimize
damage to nearby organs.”95
CDS systems can also use predictions to save lives by improving
physician decision-making. For example, AI is allowing hospitals to
“predict the likelihood of a cardiac arrest in 70 percent of occasions,
five minutes before the event occurs.”96 In addition, use of an AIenabled EKG machine resulted in more rapid identification of patients
with a difficult-to-identify heart condition.97 Similarly, AI is saving lives
by improving treatment for “a deadly blood infection called sepsis”98
and to predict “impending sepsis from a set of clinical observations and
test results.”99 In fact, in a 2016 study at the University of San
Francisco, the “death rate fell more than 12 percent” after the AI
system was implemented, “meaning patients whose treatment involved
the [AI] system were 58 percent less likely to die in the ICU.” 100 Further,
the system sped patients’ recoveries with AI-monitored patients being

92.

Challen et al., supra note 6.

93.

Id.

94.

Id. at 231–32.

95.

Id. at 231.

96.

Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1.

97.

Zachi Attia, et al., An Artificial Intelligence Enabled ECG Algorithm for
the Identification of Patients with Atrial Fibrillation During Sinus
Rhythm: A Retrospective Analysis of Outcome Prediction,
394 LANCET 861, 861 (2019) (noting, “An AI-enabled ECG acquired
during normal sinus rhythm permits identification at point of care of
individuals with atrial fibrillation” using a 10 second test and reporting
83% accuracy).

98.

Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1.

99.

Challen et al., supra note 6.

100. Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1.
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“discharged from the hospital an average of three days earlier than
those who were not” AI-monitored.101
AI can also simplify life for health care providers in ways that
improve patient outcomes. For example, AI is being used in intensive
care units (ICUs) to make “life . . . less chaotic for doctors and nurses”
by decreasing the number of false positive alarms associated with simple
vital sign monitors, which can create “alarm fatigue” for health care
workers leading them to ignore the alarms or even turn them off.102 For
example, in traditional ICUs, nurses “respond to an alarm every 90
seconds” with two out of three of those alarms being false positives—
meaning they “don’t signal real danger.”103 The FDA estimated that
“alarm-related problems contributed to more than 500 patient deaths
from 2005 to 2008.”104 AI alarm systems are better because AI “is often
able to predict problems hours in advance,” so that “doctors and nurses
get a calm, text message warning rather than having to respond to an
urgent alarm signaling that a patient is already in trouble.”105

II. Theories of Liability for AI in Medicine
Currently, there is minimal case law regarding AI liability in
medicine.106 Legal liability frameworks under products liability law,
medical malpractice law, and ordinary negligence are likely to be
applied to AI liability with some novel twists discussed below.107
A.

Products Liability

Traditional products liability law has generally provided the
framework to hold the “seller, manufacturer, distributor, or any other
party in the distribution chain” liable for physical injury or damage
caused by machines or tools, regardless of whether the product acts

101. Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro, supra note 3, at 1.
102. Salzman, supra note 3 (describing “alarm fatigue” as doctors and nurses
turning off or tuning out ICU alarms, which traditionally occur at a rate
of every 90 seconds with two thirds being false alarms).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. W. Nicholson Price et al., Potential Liability
for Physicians
Using Artificial Intelligence, 322 JAMA 1765, 1765 (2019)(noting, “there is
essentially no case law on liability involving medical AI.”).
107. Roe, supra note 14, at 328–40 (observing that in the realm of surgical
robots, “claims against the surgeons, the manufacturers of the robot, and
the hospitals where the surgeries are performed” have been filed mostly
using theories of medical malpractice, products liability, and ordinary
negligence).
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autonomously or is assisted by a human.108 For example, products
liability law has been applied to AI-like products such as autopilot in
airplanes and automated vehicle controls like cruise control and
automatic parking.109 The Restatements, and consequently many states,
say that a “product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution,
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings.”110 Each of these
categories of product defect present some unique issues when applied to
AI.
1.

Design Defect

Design defect claims have been common in the few surgical robot
claims available for review111 and are likely to be common in other
medical AI claims. According to the Restatements, “a product is
defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.”112 There are several
ways that AI might include the elements of (1) foreseeable risks, (2)
reasonable alternative design, and (3) not reasonably safe.
Note that a design defect claim “is a strict liability claim, and
therefore, the plaintiff [is] required to prove that the manufacturer
proximately caused the malfunction that led to the injuries,” which
requires “the plaintiff to prove that the machine, rather than the doctor,
caused the injury.”113 Causation is a difficult part of design defect claims
for AI due to the complex way that “artificial intelligence and human
oversight are intertwined,” and this issue is further discussed under
medical malpractice below.114
a.

Foreseeable Risks

AI algorithms include some unique foreseeable risks. For a product
to be defective, the risks must be foreseeable such that, “[o]nce the
plaintiff establishes that the product was put to a reasonably
foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are generally known or
108. Karni A. Chagal-Feferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product? When
Products Liability Should Apply to Algorithmic Decision-Makers,
30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 62–63 (2019).
109. Id. at 63.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
111. Roe, supra note 14, at 328–40 (reporting “[b]oth product liability and
design defect claims are also common in surgical robot litigation”).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998) (emphasis
added).
113. Roe, supra note 14, at 332.
114. Id.
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reasonably knowable by experts in the field.”115 Common knowledge
that is attributable to experts in the field is imputable to manufacturers
of AI.116 AI includes foreseeable risks common to many other types of
products like malfunction, user error, normal wear and tear, among
other things, which are likely to present similar issues and have similar
liability profiles to non-AI products and therefore, are not discussed
here. Some unique foreseeable risks discussed here associated with AI
include bad data, discrimination, corruption, and others.
i.

Bad Data

AI’s deep learning depends upon quality data, with some experts
noting “there is nothing more critical than the data.”117 Large amounts
of data are involved in health care interactions. If the AI uses bad data
to generate models, it “can be amplified into worse models” than nonAI models.118 The AMA’s AI policy includes priorities of transparency
and reproducibility,119 which are reliant upon having good data. Factors
involving data that can cause flaws in deep learning outcomes include
(1) data volume, (2) data quality, (3) temporality, (4) domain
complexity, and (5) interpretability.
First, data volume is required. In health care “the number of
patients is usually limited in a practical clinical scenario.”120 In order to
meet its goal of accuracy and improved outcomes, a “huge amount of
data” is required; “while there are no hard guidelines about the
minimum number of training documents, a general rule of thumb is to
have at least about 10 [times] the number of samples as parameters in
the network.”121 So in domains where a “huge amount of data can be
easily collected,” like image or speech recognition, deep learning can be

115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §2 cmt. m (1998).
116. See A.G.S., Annotation, Duty of manufacturer or seller to warn of latent
dangers incident to article as a class, as distinguished from duty with
respect to defects in particular article, 86 A.L.R. 947 (originally published
in 1933); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (AM. L.
INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (AM. L. INST.
1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. L.
INST. 1998); Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States, 262 U.S.
215, 222 (1923) (“The general rule is that a principal is charged with the
knowledge of the agent acquired by the agent in the course of the
principal’s business.”).
117. Abraham Verghese et
Physician: Humanism
(2018).

al., What This Computer Needs is a
and Artificial Intelligence, 319 JAMA 19, 19

118. Id.
119. AMA Policy, supra note 17.
120. Miotto, supra note 66, at 1242
121. Id. at 1241.
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very successful.122 In clinical decision-making from EMRs,
“understanding diseases and their variability is much more
complicated” than image or speech recognition, and the “amount of
medical data that is needed to train an effective and robust deep
learning model would be much more comparing with other media.”123
Second, data quality is required, and health care data are not
typically as “clean and well-structured” as data in other domains.
Because “health care data are highly heterogeneous, ambiguous, noisy,
and incomplete,” data quality must be questioned and considered in
training a good deep learning model, which leads to special challenges
considering “data sparsity, redundancy, and missing values.”124
Third, temporality of data is important. Deep learning models often
“assume static vector-based inputs” that do not adapt to changes over
time; this can be problematic in medicine where “diseases are always
progressing and changing over time.”125 Fourth, data complexity is
important. In health care, “diseases are highly heterogenous and for
most diseases there is still no complete knowledge on their causes and
how they progress.”126 Fifth, interpretability is important. To convince
medical professionals regarding “the actions recommended from the
predictive system (e.g., prescription of a specific medication, potential
high risk of developing a certain disease),” deep learning models will
need to be transparent and not an opaque black box—which is different
than many domains.127
The maxim of “garbage in, garbage out” is especially important
when applying AI models to health care data, and special care must be
taken to ensure that the data upon which AI models are based is good.128
ii.

Discrimination

Theoretically, AI systems “make objective decisions and do not
have the same subjective biases that influence human decision
making.”129 However, in reality, “AI systems are subject to many of the
same biases” as human decision-making because AI is often trained
using imperfect data sets.130 “[W]ithout proper awareness and control
[AI] systems can amplify biases and unfairness that already exists
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1242.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Beam & Kohane, supra note 60, at 1318.
129. Tom Lawry et al., Realizing the Potential for AI in Precision Health,
13 THE SCITECH LAW. 22, 24 (2017).
130. Id.
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within datasets—or can ‘learn’ biases” during the process of machine
learning.131 The AMA AI policy includes avoiding bias and avoiding
exacerbation of disparities for vulnerable populations among its
priorities for AI systems.132
There are numerous ways bias can be introduced by AI. First, AI
biases can result from “under-representation” in datasets of some
populations that may “hide population differences in disease risk or
treatment efficacy.”133 In one example, researchers “found that
cardiomyopathy genetic tests were better able to identify pathogenic
variants in white patients than patients of other ethnicities.”134
Second, “nonrepresentative data collection” can result in bias.135
For example, data sets gathered from apps and wearables “may skew
toward socioeconomically advantaged populations with greater access
to connected devices and cloud services.”136 Likewise, expensive genetic
testing results in datasets that are skewed toward richer consumers.137
The location of the dataset can also contribute to bias and
nonrepresentative data collection. For example, data collected from
EMRs comes from health systems that have implemented such EMR
systems, which may lead to underrepresentation of “the uninsured and
underinsured and those without consistent access to quality health care
(such as some patients in rural areas).138 Further, EMR data can
introduce bias when it is collected for patient care and billing instead
of for research because important “clinical contextual information” can
be missing.139
Third, care must be taken to make sure AI is not applied unfairly.
For example, if a machine learning system is used to predict 6 to 12
month mortality rates to help physicians with prognostic projections
regarding hospice care, it should not be used to “withhold treatment
from patients with a higher mortality risk.”140

131. Id.
132. AMA Policy, supra note 17.
133. Lawry et al., supra note 129.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; “Clinical context” means interpreting data in the context of the
patient’s other symptoms. Doctors must look at patients holistically, i.e.,
look at the whole patient. AI may just look at data points and make a
mistake where it fails to consider the whole clinical picture. See also
Section III.A.1.b.
140. Id. at 25.
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Fourth, an AI system can reflect the biases of its developers and
users.141 Therefore, diversity in developers, users, teams, health care
professionals, and medical experts is necessary to avoid bias and
discrimination.142 In addition, AI scientists “must continue to develop
analytical techniques to detect and address unfairness in AI-driven
technologies.”143
iii.

Corruption and Industry-Led Bias

AI raises the possibility of “abhorrent” corruption filtering into
clinical decision support tools, as shown by a recent $145 million
settlement with the DOJ by an EMR vendor in the “first ever criminal
action against an EHR vendor.”144 Pharmaceutical companies and other
medical supply vendors may gain access to clinical decision support
tools and use those tools to direct doctors to prescribe their products.
For example, in January 2020, an EMR vendor paid the DOJ $145
million to settle criminal and civil investigations related to its admission
that it “solicited and received kickbacks from a major opioid company
in exchange for utilizing its EHR software to influence physician
prescribing of opioid pain medications” by manipulating its EMR
software.145 According to the DOJ, the EMR company, Practice Fusion,
“extracted unlawful kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies in
exchange for implementing clinical decision support (CDS) alerts in its
EHR software designed to increase prescriptions for their drug
products.”146 According to the DOJ, the EMR company—”in exchange
for ‘sponsorship’ payments”—allowed pharmaceutical companies to
“participate in designing the CDS alert, including selecting the
guidelines used to develop the alerts, setting the criteria that would
determine when a health care provider received an alert, and in some
cases, even drafting the language used in the alert itself”; this was done
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id.
144. Press Release, Department of Justice, Electronic Health Records Vendor
to Pay $145 Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Jan.
27, 2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/electronic-healthrecords-vendor-pay-145-million-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations0 [https://perma.cc/DN2L-NHCM] [hereinafter DOJ].
145. Id. (further explaining that Practice Fusion “executed a deferred
prosecution agreement and agreed to pay over $26 million in criminal fines
and forfeiture,” and it also agreed to pay ”$118.6 million to the federal
government and states to resolve allegations that it accepted kickbacks
from the opioid company and other pharmaceutical companies.”).
146. Id. (“In discussions with pharmaceutical companies, Practice Fusion
touted the anticipated financial benefit to the pharmaceutical companies
from increased sales of pharmaceutical products that would result from
the CDS alerts.”).
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“in ways aimed at increasing the sales of the companies’ products” and
“did not always reflect accepted medical standards.”147 For example,
the criminal information detailed by the DOJ alleged that “Practice
Fusion solicited a payment of nearly $1 million from the opioid
company to create a CDS alert that would cause doctors to prescribe
more extended release opioids” and “touted that it would result in a
favorable return on investment for the opioid company based on doctors
prescribing more opioids.”148
The Assistant Inspector General noted, “‘As new technologies
continue to develop and evolve, so too do new and innovative fraud
schemes.’”149 Civil claims could follow for patients injured by criminal
activity, and companies could be liable for failing to prevent criminal
activity during development of their products. Liability could be
present for doctors who failed to recognize deviations from clinical
practice guidelines and for hospitals that did not adequately investigate
potential fraud under liability theories mentioned elsewhere in this
paper.
iv.

Other Unique Foreseeable Risks

AI’s complex and rapidly developing applications create
innumerable foreseeable risks beyond the scope of this paper that will
become apparent as AI continues to be implemented in the medical
field. The AMA Policy foreshadows a few potential risks that will be
briefly mentioned here.150 For example, the AMA Policy states that the
AMA will help “integrate the perspective of practicing physicians into
the development, design, validation and implementation of health care
AI” and sets a priority of “best practices in user-centered design.”151
The AMA states that “a major source of dissatisfaction in physicians’
professional lives” is physicians’ “frustrations with electronic health
records . . . especially usability issues.”152 If AI developers fail to
adequately consider the end user, then foreseeable risks are present that
are unique to the health care environment.153 Physicians are commonly
known to be extremely busy with limited time to address complex
patient issues, so AI that hinders the flow of care, disrupts physicians’
workflow, or distracts physician decision-making foreseeably causes
patient harm.154 Therefore, AI developers who fail to consider end-user
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See AMA Policy, supra note 17.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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issues may face liability for design defects where injury may have been
prevented by making the device more user-centric.
Other foreseeable risks include inadequate end-user training, loss of
patient privacy, inadequate security to protect patient data, and other
risks.
b.

Reasonable Alternative Designs

Another factor in determining whether a product is defective is
whether adopting a reasonable alternative design (RAD) could have
reduced the risk of harm.155 The possibilities for AI RAD are many.
First, RAD options may include devices without AI. A human-only
interaction may be better than an AI-facilitated interaction in some
situations. Often, human “clinicians make assumptions and care choices
that are not neatly documented as structured data” and often rely on
clinical “intuition” developed from human experiences.156 “[D]octors
make decisions on more than just the data available in a patient’s
chart,”157 which leads some to describe medicine as both an “art” and a
science.158 In other words, “clinical judgment is not well represented by
data” in medicine.159 For example, AI may fail to recognize context of
data. Context of data is important, and machines may have problems
with data taken out of context where the machine fails to recognize
artifacts.160 In one example, AI missed context in evaluating the risk of
death from pneumonia at the University of Pittsburg Medical Center
(UPMC) when AI determined that the risk of death was lower in
pneumonia patients over 100 years of age and in patients with asthma
arriving at the emergency department.161 The AI algorithm “correctly
analyzed the underlying data” but failed to understand the context that
“their risk was so high that the emergency department staff gave these
patients antibiotics before they were even registered into the electronic
medical record,” which made the time stamps for the “lifesaving
antibiotics” inaccurate.162 If the AI predictions had been taken out of
context, then pneumonia patients over 100 years of age and those with
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
156. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.
157. Kuhnen & Rebhan, supra note 9.
158. The ”Art” and ”Science” of Medicine, 184 JAMA 142, 142 (1963),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/664090.
159. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.
160. Verghese et al., supra note 117, at 19 (“For example, a model might
classify patients with a history of asthma who present with pneumonia as
having a lower risk of mortality than those with pneumonia alone, not
registering the context that this is an artifact of clinicians admitting and
treating such patients earlier and more aggressively.”).
161. Kocher & Emanuel, supra note 1.
162. Id.
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asthma could have been treated less aggressively—leading to likely
deaths and additional harm to these high-risk populations.163
Sometimes AI can interfere with important human components of
medicine—like touch, compassion, and empathy—that many recognize
as part of the art of medicine. Illness is more than just a physical or
biological experience.164 The doctor-patient relationship includes
elements like touch, compassion, empathy, context, and other human
elements that AI alone cannot provide.165 The “placebo effect” has been
found across medical fields, from surgery, to back pain treatments, to
medications suggesting that the mind can play an important part in
illness not represented by data on the patient’s chart.166 Medicine is not
purely a science that can be managed with statistics, mathematics, and
computer algorithms, and overreliance on AI may lead to harm in
instances when human compassion, human touch, or human
interpretation of data context is necessary. For example, when a robot
recently delivered the news to a patient and his family that he would
die soon from cancer, news outlets, the family, and experts were all
aghast.167 “[A] tall machine on wheels . . . rolled into the [patient’s]
room [in the hospital]” with “a screen streaming a live video of a doctor
wearing a headset [attached].”168 The doctor delivered the news of the
poor CT scan results and recommended morphine to keep the patient
comfortable, while the robot stood on the side of the patient’s bad ear
where he barely seemed to understand.169 The patient died within 48
hours.170 The patient’s daughter said, “‘It should have been a

163. Id.
164. DEREK BOLTON & GRANT GILLETT, THE BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL MODEL OF
HEALTH AND DISEASE: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC
DEVELOPMENTS (2019), NCBI Bookshelf.
165. See Caitlin Kelly, The Importance of Medical Touch, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/well/live/the-importanceof-medical-touch.html [https://perma.cc/AW9J-BURX];
Michael M. Patterson, Touch: Vital to Patient-Physician Relationships,
112 J. OF THE AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 485, 485 (2012).
166. See The Power of the Placebo Effect, HARVARD HEALTH PUBL’G (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.health.harvard.edu/mental-health/the-power-of-theplacebo-effect [https://perma.cc/SF38-XPS7].
167. Julia
Jacobs, Doctor
on
a Video Screen Told
a Man He Was
Near Death, Leaving Relatives Aghast, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/science/telemedicine-ethicalissues.html [https://perma.cc/6WQ8-87VN] (The 78 year old man was
told by a “videoconference” robot with a live doctor on the video screen
that he would die soon from cancer).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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human’ . . . ‘It should’ve been a doctor who came up to his bedside.’”171
In evaluating the incident, the AMA president said, “‘We should all
remember the power of touch—simple human contact—can
communicate caring better than words’.”172 One medical ethicist noted,
“technology may not be sensitive enough to pick up nuanced social cues,
like body language and tone of voice, in an emotionally charged
moment.”173
However, for many AI systems, the argument that humans alone
are better as a RAD will likely fail because even when AI systems have
notable issues, they still often outperform humans alone. For example,
in total hip replacement surgery, there is a notable learning curve for
surgeons placing the acetabular cup, with surgeons obtaining better
positioning after their first 50 cases.174 However, even the first 50
placements are better than for non-AI navigated hips.175
Second, for RAD options, choosing a different data set, a modified
software design, different clinical practice guidelines, or some other
technological changes based on expert testimony are likely to be more
fruitful for plaintiffs in most instances than suggesting eliminating the
AI altogether. For example, RADs for surgical robots might include
using different sensory techniques for sensors in the rooms (e.g., optical
vs. electromagnetic). Simplified navigational procedures may also be a
RAD proposal where robotic computer navigation is associated with
significant learning curves for surgeons.176
Third, user-interface modifications to make the human/AI
interaction better will be an obvious point for RAD consideration. The
AMA policy emphasizes the importance of “best practices in usercentered design” and the need for companies to “integrate the
perspective of practicing physicians into the development, design,
validation and implementation of health care AI.”177 When companies
fail to do so, they open themselves up to RAD arguments. Based upon
the AMA’s mention of physicians’ “frustrations with electronic health
records (EHRs), especially usability issues,” as a “major source of
dissatisfaction” among doctors, this area of design may be a particularly

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Waddell & Padgett, supra note 31, at 425.
175. Id.
176. See Frank Griffin, The Trouble with the Curve: Manufacturer and
Surgeon Liability for “Learning Curves” Associated with UnreliablyScreened Implantable Medical Devices, 69 ARK. L. REV. 755, 757 (2016)
(describing surgeon learning curves associated with new medical devices).
177. AMA Policy, supra note 17.
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ripe point to target faulty AI in design defect claims.178 One example of
a case where a RAD could include some user interface change involved
a May 2009 article entitled “Nearly Killed by E-Records Data Model.”179
The article described the experience of an ICU patient who was “nearly
killed” because of an EMR system “that did not allow doctors and
nurses to access critical medical information or obtain medication from
the pharmacy in a timely fashion.”180 A RAD here might simply be a
more user-friendly interface. The possibilities for RAD are endless for
AI and will continue to evolve over time.
c.

Not Reasonably Safe

In Restatement jurisdictions, the jury must find that the device at
issue in the trial is “not reasonably safe.”181 Other states have adopted
modifications of the Restatement language, using phrases like
“unreasonably dangerous.”182 If the state uses the “Consumer
Expectations Test,” generally the device sold “must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be expected by the ordinary
consumer.”183 Reasonableness is also often analyzed using risk-utility
balancing as described by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co.184 Other reasonableness factors, like those identified
by Professor John Wade, are used by some jurisdictions in risk-utility
evaluations.185
178. Id.
179. Sharona Hoffman &
Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards:
Provider
Liability and Electronic Health Records Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 1523, 1526-27 (2009). Tony Collins, “Nearly Killed” by e-records data
(May
21,
2009
9:13),
model,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM,
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/05/21/236128/nearlykilled-by-e-records-data-model.htm [https://perma.cc/N962-XD2R].
180. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 179, at 1527.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965)
(Comment i defines “unreasonably dangerous” as “dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it”). See, e.g., Horst v. Deere & Co., 752 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 769 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. 2009) (applying the
“unreasonably dangerous” standard to products liability law).
183. David Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and
Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 134–35 (2014) (noting that
if the state uses the consumer expectations test it may define an
“unreasonably dangerous” product as one with a defect that makes the
product “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it”).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998);
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
185. John W. Wade, On The nature of Strict
Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837–38 (1973).

88

Tort

Liability

for

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
AI and Liability in Health Care

AI will likely shift the definition of “reasonableness.” For instance,
in the case of an AI system, the focus will be on whether the AI system
performed as well as it should, not whether it performed as safely as a
reasonable human-alone system.186 Ironically, a 1966 court recognized
the issue well before AI was in common use in discussing liability
standards:
A human being, no matter how efficient, is not a mechanical robot
and does not possess the ability of a radar machine to discover
danger before it becomes manifest. Some allowances, however
slight, must be made for human frailties and for reaction, and if
any allowance whatever is made for the fact that a human being
must require a fraction of a second for reaction and cannot
respond with the mechanical speed and accuracy such as is found
in modern mechanical devices . . . 187

The Louisiana court foreshadows the argument that a “mechanical
robot” may be held to a higher standard.188 Today, the court will not
ask whether the AI performed as well as a reasonable human; instead,
the question will be whether the AI performed as well as it was supposed
to perform based on the performance of other AI systems and the
performance specifications of the manufacturer.189
AI systems may also be unreasonably dangerous when the humanuser interface is too difficult or when the systems do not make
allowances for the humanness of their users. EMRs may be particularly
susceptible to this argument. For example, one EMR vendor faced a
class-action lawsuit alleging software defects that threatened patient
safety and that also entangled hospitals that adopted the EMR; the
class-action complaint was led by a patient’s estate who died of cancer
allegedly because “‘he was unable to determine reliably when his first
symptoms of cancer appeared [as] his medical records failed to
accurately display his medical history on progress notes.’”190 The

186. Vladeck, supra note 183, at 132 (noting that the court in a driverless car
case will “likely ask whether the car involved in the accident performed
up to the standards achievable by the majority of other driver-less cars,
as well as the performance specification set by the car’s manufacturer”
and not whether it performed up to the standards of human drivers).
187. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 132.
190. Lawsuit Claims EHR Dangerous to Patients, Could Affect
Hospitals, RELIAS MEDIA (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.reliasmedia.com/
articles/142432-lawsuit-claims-ehr-dangerous-to-patients-could-affecthospitals [https://perma.cc/994J-5DP6].
Complaint
at
16,
Tot
v. eClincal Works,
LLC,
No.
17-8938
(S.D.N.Y.
2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/004-
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complaint also alleged that the software failed to “reliably record
diagnostic imaging orders,” provided “insufficient audit logs,” had
“issues with data portability,” and was not compliant with criteria
required for certification.191
Unfriendly EMR user-interfaces can create a good argument for
unreasonable dangerousness. One observer noted, “most EMRs serve
their frontline users quite poorly.”192 “The redundancy of the notes, the
burden of alerts, and the overflowing inbox has led to the ‘4000
keystrokes a day’ problem’ and has contributed to, and perhaps even
accelerated, physician reports of symptoms of burnout.”193 When
doctors spend all of their time on computers, patient care suffers.194
EMRs may provide significant opportunities for “unreasonably
dangerous” arguments. For example, in one medical malpractice case,
the physician allegedly did not have adequate space to document the
patient’s symptoms, which allegedly led to the mismanagement of the
patient’s condition resulting in a heart problem.195 In another case, a
patient’s diagnosis of and treatment for cancer was allegedly delayed
for years because the EHR system used by the provider referred the
physician to outdated imaging.196 Each of these issues might provide a
foundation for a plaintiff to argue that the EMR was “unreasonably
dangerous” in a design defect claim.
EHR-related risks are due to system technology and design issues
or due to user-related issues.197 According to one study, the top system
technology and design issues include (1) electronic systems/technology
Healthcare/external_Q42017/eclinicalworks_classaction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92TV-N3UN].
191. RELIAS MEDIA, supra note 189.
192. Verghese et al., supra note 117, at 19.
193. Id.
194. See id (“The unanticipated consequences include the loss of important
social rituals (between physicians and between physicians and nurses and
other health care workers) around the chart rack and in the radiology
suite, where all specialties converged to discuss patients.”).
195. Penny Greenberg & Gretchen Ruoff, Malpractice Risks Associated with
Electronic
Health
Records,
CRICO
(June
13,
2017),
https://www.rmf.harvard.edu/Clinician-Resources/Article/2017/
Malpractice-Risks-Associated-with-Electronic-Health-Records
[https://perma.cc/Y5YZ-E75J].
196. Vera Lücia Raposo, Electronic Health Records: Is it a Risk Worth Taking
in Healthcare Delivery?, 11 GMS HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT 1,
2 (2015); see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 179, at 1525–26
(listing benefits of EHRs).
197. Darrell Ranum, Electronic Health Records Continue to Lead to Medical
Malpractice
Suits, DOCTORS
COMPANY (Aug.
2019),
https://www.thedoctors.com/articles/electronic-health-records-continueto-lead-to-medical-malpractice-suits/ [https://perma.cc/TE6W-MZMV].
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failure in 12% of EMR-related claims from 2010 to 2018, (2) lack of, or
failure of, EMR alerts or alarms in 7% of claims, (3) fragmented record
in 6% of claims, (4) failure/lack of electronic routing of data in 5% of
claims, (5) insufficient scope/area for documentation in EMR in 4% of
claims, (6) lack of integration/incompatible systems in 2% of claims,
and (7) other issues in 14% of claims.198 Only one claim in this study
involved failure to ensure information security.199
Expert testimony will be required for most “unreasonably
dangerous” AI arguments. 200 The AI industry will have an
overwhelming advantage of access to AI experts, much like that
described for orthopedic devices.201 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
the trial court serves as a “gatekeeper” to prevent unreliable and
irrelevant scientific testimony from entering the courtroom.202 Four
nonexclusive factors are to be used by trial courts to determine the
reliability of expert testimony, including: “‘(1) whether the ‘scientific
knowledge . . . can be (and has been) tested’; (2) whether ‘the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication’; (3)
‘the known or potential rate of error’; and (4) ‘general acceptance.’”203
Importantly, AI manufacturers will have decisive advantages in all four
of those factors. First, the AI companies will likely be the ones doing
the scientific testing, which may bias research outcomes. Second, peer
review and publication will likely be performed by AI scientists working
for companies, again introducing bias. Third, any known or potential
error rate will likely be discovered by AI companies, which may limit
disclosure. Fourth, general acceptance will be up to AI scientists
working for AI companies, which may limit the field of witnesses willing
to testify on behalf of injured plaintiffs.
2.

Manufacturing Defect

According to the Restatements, “a product contains a
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Roe, supra note 14, at 330, 339.
201. See Frank Griffin, Prejudicial Interpretation of Expert Reliability on the
‘Cutting Edge’ Enables
the Orthopedic Implant Industry’s Bodily
Eminent Domain Claim, 18 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 207, 237–38 (2017).
202. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 145–47 (1999).
203. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213,
at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (noting, “Daubert makes clear that the
factors it mentions do not constitute a definitive checklist or test.
(emphasis in the original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)”).
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and marketing of the product.”204 Strict liability typically applies.205
“Generally, to establish a claim for strict liability, ‘a plaintiff must
demonstrate, inter alia, that the product was defective, that the defect
caused the plaintiff’s injury, and the defect existed at the time the
product left the manufacturer’s control.’”206 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts says that liability “applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.”207
One example of an alleged AI manufacturing defect involved the da
Vinci robot, which the plaintiff alleged had “microcracking” allowing
“electricity to escape in the form of sparks” from monopolar curved
scissors dubbed “Hot Shears” resulting in “internal burns to [the
plaintiff’s] rectum” during a robotically-assisted prostatectomy.208
Expert testimony is almost always required to establish claims for strict
products liability.209 A court in a prior case had found that “the da
Vinci robot is a complex machine, one in which a juror would require
the assistance of expert testimony in order to reasonably determine if
the robot had a defect;” 210 thus, the court decided that the operative
report of the surgeon describing the “narrative of the robot failing to
function properly” was not adequate because the surgeon did “not opine
that the robot ha[d] a defect.”211 The court also noted that the surgeon
may have “used that same da Vinci robot in dozens of previous
operations without any trouble,” seeming to imply that this might show
it was not defective.212 Without expert testimony, summary judgment
was granted for the defendant.213
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
205. Id.
206. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp.,
2010) (citation omitted).

363

F. App’x 925,

926

(3d

Cir.

207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965); Mracek v.
Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 404 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 363
F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (In states where the
Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A has been adopted, ”§ 402A
‘imposes strict liability in tort not only for injuries caused by the defective
manufacture of products, but also for injuries caused by defects in their
design.’”).
208. Pohly v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 15-CV-04113-MEJ, 2017 WL 900760,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017).
209. See, e.g., Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (noting that without
an expert report, the plaintiff failed to establish a claim for strict liability).
210. Id. at 405.
211. Id. at 405–06.
212. Id. at 406.
213. Id. at 406–07.
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Manufacturing defects for AI are likely to be treated similarly to
other manufacturing defects, and therefore, are not covered extensively
here.
3. Failure to Warn

According to the Restatements, “a product is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller . . . and
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not
reasonably safe.”214
Some argue that some AI products are “unavoidably unsafe” under
the Restatements.215 For example, the Washington Supreme Court
considered the da Vinci robot as “unavoidably unsafe” and held that
the manufacturer of the da Vinci system failed to fulfill its duty to warn
the hospital and surgeon about the robot.216 An unavoidably unsafe
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
216. Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 187 Wash.2d 743, 769 (2017)
(noting that an exception to strict liability for products liability is
provided by comment k for unavoidably unsafe products only when the
manufacturer provides adequate warning of the unavoidably unsafe nature
of their product); Comment k states:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many
new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time
and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he
has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk.
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product is “one that is unable to be made safe for its intended and
ordinary use” and therefore, carries with it a duty to warn the users of
the product.217 A manufacturer may qualify for an exception to strict
liability under comment k only if it provides proper warnings and
marketing to the end user.218
In the Washington da Vinci case, the patient’s intraoperative
complication was a laceration of the rectal wall caused by the surgical
robot that required the doctor to convert the operation to an open
procedure and bring in another surgeon to repair the rectal tear.219 The
patient ultimately died four years later, after suffering through
numerous subsequent complications allegedly related to the rectal tear
including incontinence, the need for a colostomy bag, respiratory failure
requiring a ventilator, kidney failure, infection, neuromuscular damage
causing difficulty with walking, among others.220
The Washington State Supreme Court created “an unexpected shift
in the law with regards to the standard that applies to medical device
manufacturers’ duty to warn”221 when it held “that device
manufacturers are indeed liable for ensuring that their product is safely
adopted by its users.”222 The decision has major implications for
hospitals, surgeons, and physician leadership and “seem[s] to destroy
the learned intermediary doctrine.”223 Washington became “the first
state to impose a duty on medical device manufacturers to warn
hospitals” about surgical robots.224
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
217. Roe, supra note 14, at 340.
218. Taylor, 187 Wash.2d at 743.
219. Id. at 750.
220. Id.
221. Catherine Mullaley, Washington Supreme Court Holds That Medical
Device Manufacturers Have A Duty to Warn Hospitals—Taylor v.
Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 43 AM. J. L. & MED. 165, 168 (2017).
222. Jason Pradarelli, et al., Who is Responsible for the Safe Introduction
of New Surgical Technology? An Important Legal Precedent from the Da
Vinci Surgical System Trials, 152 JAMA 717, 717 (2017).
223. Mullaley, supra note 221, at 168.
224. Nathan Reeves, Medical Device Manufactures’ Duty to Warn
Expands, MED. DEVICE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2017), http://knobbemedical.com/
medicaldeviceblog/article/washington-state-supreme-court-modifiesduty-warn-device-manufacturers/
[https://perma.cc/AQM4-7HKL].
Roe, supra note 14, at 328–40 (observing that the Washington Supreme
Court held the manufacturer liable even though the surgeon (1) was
performing his first unproctored da Vinci prostatectomy, (2) performed
the procedure on the patient whose level of obesity was clearly outside
the recommended parameters provided by the manufacturer, (3)
performed the procedure in a surgical position not recommended by the
manufacturer (i.e., the patient was not in the Trendelenberg position),
and (4) performed the surgery on the patient who had undergone previous
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AI is associated with a learning curve.225 For example, in total hip
replacement surgery, the learning curve for robot-assisted navigation
results in notable improvements in acetabular cup placement after 50
cases.226 Reducing learning curves and preparing hospitals and surgeons
to safely use AI devices falls at least partially to the manufacturer. At
least one company is using virtual reality training to train surgeons.
Smith and Nephew, an orthopedic device maker, “recently collaborated
with Osso VR, a surgical training company, to create a module for the
NAVIO Surgical System.”227 The NAVIO training module “is designed
to be used by practicing surgeons and residents who are learning the
robotics-assisted procedure and involves clinically supported virtual
reality (VR) simulations of the procedure.”228 As companies institute
these types of training, some type of similar VR training may become
a “reasonable” expectation in products liability cases, effectively raising
the standard of care for companies and surgeons alike—so that by the
time a surgeon performs their first robotic surgery on a patient, a
significant amount of VR training may become the norm. By requiring
the doctor who is using new AI to participate in learning activities
before clinical use, the companies may help satisfy their duty to warn
under products liability law.
B.

Medical Malpractice

AI adds an additional layer of complexity (e.g., adding superseding
causes and mitigation of damages) to medical malpractice cases, with
minimal current law available to help with the evaluation.229 Generally,
physicians “must provide care at the level of a competent physician
within the same specialty, taking into account available resources.”230
In applying AI in health care, the “key step [is] separating prediction
from action and recommendation” with the machine making the
prediction and the human deciding upon recommendations and
actions.231 One observer noted, “Proper interpretation and use of
computerized data will depend as much on wise doctors as any other
lower abdominal surgeries—again against the recommendations of the
company).
225. See Claudia Perlich, Learning
Curves
in
Machine
Learning,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MACH. LEARNING (2011), https://www.tcs.com/blogs/
human-learning-curve-for-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/Y999HQHK].
226. Waddell & Padgett, supra note 31, at 425.
227. Carfagno, supra note 40.
228. Id.
229. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765 (noting, “there is essentially no case
law on liability involving medical AI.”); Roe, supra note 14, at 330.
230. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765.
231. Verghese et al., supra note 117, at 19.
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source of data in the past.”232 Medical malpractice elements include
duty, breach, causation and damages. AI can have unique effects on
each of these elements.
1.

Duty and Breach

Physicians have a duty to provide the human interface for AI so
that data are interpreted properly and so that recommendations make
clinical sense. EMRs and their clinical decision support (CDS) tools are
adding “an army of new liability risks” which physicians must now
navigate because EMRs have been ubiquitously adopted by “almost all
health care entities.”233 In alleged malpractice cases, “more discoverable
evidence” is available than ever before because EMRs increase the
amount of documentation of clinical decisions.234 Doctors have a duty
to make sure that the EMR data relied upon for clinical decisions is
correct and evaluated. EMRs tempt doctors “to copy and paste patient
information and data” instead of adding new information, which may
“perpetuat[e] . . . prior inaccuracies” and lead to missing new
information or information that has changed.235 Email and
telecommunication encounters with patients are “multiplying the
number of patient encounters manifold” and may lead to a concomitant
increase in malpractice claims; these encounters may also “heighten the
risk if medical advice is offered without a recorded physical examination
and a comprehensive investigation of patients complaints.”236 The
physician’s duty does not change just because the communication is
electronic.
In addition, AI has the ability to deliver “information overload”
that “may lead to physicians missing important clinical information
amid the noise and chaos.”237 The physician has a duty to navigate this
information overload with expertise.238 Improved access to patients’
clinical information via EMRs will likely create additional legal duties
to act upon that information.239 The physician may also have a duty to
use health information exchanges “to search the extensive data
generated by health care providers” as EMR systems become more
232. Id.
233. Zachary Paterick
et
al., Medical Liability
in
the Electronic
Medical Records Era, 31 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROC. 558, 558 (2018).
234. Id. (observing, “Clinical decisions are extensively documented, creating
more discoverable evidence including metadata.”).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 559.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 558.
239. Id. at 559 (stating, ““Better access to clinical information through EMRs
may create legal duties to act on the information.”).
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interconnected.240 In addition, with increasing development of health
information exchanges, physicians could be subject to a legal duty to
review outside records for which they have not previously been held
responsible—again changing the standard of care.241 Given that most
physicians only have 15-20 minutes to “take a history, examine a
patient, and review the EMR” and given the large amount of extraneous
information contained in today’s electronic health records, with records
often being hundreds or even thousands of pages, required review of all
of this information as part of the standard of care may often be
unreasonable.242
Therefore, unsurprisingly, EMRs are playing an increasing role in
medical malpractice lawsuits, with claims involving EMRs tripling from
2010 to 2018.243 Overall, however, EMR-related cases were only 1.1
percent of claims closed since 2010 in one study.244 But as adoption
continues at an almost-universal level, these cases are likely to increase
in frequency. In one example, a physician gave the patient a morphine
dose over 10 times the dosage intended by clicking the wrong selection
on the EHR’s drop down menu, which only offered either 15 or 200
milligram dosages.245
EMRs are usually deemed contributing factors in medical
malpractice claims rather than the primary cause. 246 In one study,
EMR-related factors that contributed to patient harm included user
error in 17%, incorrect information in the record in 16%, copy/paste
errors in 14%, “conversion issues (hybrid paper & electronic records)”
in 13%, and system/software design issues in 12%.247 User-related errors
include copy and paste errors where users copy and paste redundant,
outdated, or erroneous information, propagating it throughout the
patient’s chart, often making it difficult for physicians and nurses to

240. Id.
241. Id. at 560.
242. Id.
243. Ranum, supra note 197 (“The Doctors Company’s analysis of claims in
which EHRs contributed to injury show a total of 216 claims closed from
2010 to 2018. The pace of these claims grew, from a low of seven cases in
2010 to an average of 22.5 cases per year in 2017 and 2018.”).
244. Id. (“The Doctors Company’s analysis of claims in which EHRs
contributed to injury show a total of 216 claims closed from 2010 to 2018.
The pace of these claims grew, from a low of seven cases in 2010 to an
average of 22.5 cases per year in 2017 and 2018.”).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Greenberg & Ruoff, supra note 195 (focusing on concerns raised by
unintended consequences of HIT).
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sort through the chart to make good decisions and can lead to patient
injury.248
In medical malpractice cases, physicians breach their legal duties
when they fail to meet the standard of care, which means that
physicians are generally “held to a standard of learning and skill
normally possessed by such specialists in the same or similar locality
under similar circumstances” or some similar standard dependent upon
state law.249 The legal standard of care is not fixed and is constantly
evolving.250 The standard of care is almost always a “matter peculiarly
within the knowledge of experts,” so expert testimony is usually
required to establish the relevant standard of care.251 As one physician
commentator noted, “sooner rather than later,” with AI entering
medical practice, “physicians need to know how law will assign liability
for injuries that arise from interaction between algorithms and
practitioners.”252
AI will rapidly influence the standard of care.253 As noted earlier,
AI can currently (1) “look at brain scans of people who are exhibiting
memory loss and tell who will go on to develop full-blown Alzheimer’s
disease and who won’t,”254 (2) allow hospitals “to predict the likelihood
of a cardiac arrest in 70 percent of occasions, five minutes before the
event occurs,”255 and (3) save lives and speed hospital discharge by
improving treatment for “a deadly blood infection called sepsis.”256 At
some point, as each of these technologies become more widely available,
each may become a part of the “standard of care” for treating patients
248. Sue Bowman, Impact of Electronic Health Record Systems on Information
Integrity: Quality and Safety Implications, PERSP. HEALTH INFO.
MGMT. 1,4 (Fall 2013) (calling attention to safety hazards of EHRs).
249. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213,
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019).
250. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765 (pointing out, “The legal standard of
care is key to liability for medical AI, but it is not forever fixed. Over
time, the standard of care may shift.”).
251. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213,
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Paterick et
al., supra note 233, at 560.
252. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1766.
253. Id.
254. Yuhas, supra note 2.
255. Salzman, supra note 3; Shimabukuro et al., supra note 3, at 1.
256. Salzman, supra note 3 (In fact, in a 2016 study at the University of San
Francisco, the “death rate fell more than 12 percent” after the AI system
was implemented “meaning patients whose treatment involved the [AI]
system were 58 percent less likely to die in the ICU.” Further, the system
sped patients’ recoveries with AI monitored patients being “discharged
from the hospital an average of three days earlier than those who were
not.”); Shimabukuro et al., supra note 3, at 1.
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with the respective issues. Early adapters risk stepping outside the
“standard of care” when other doctors are reluctant to embrace new
AI-powered technologies, whereas late adapters also risk violating the
standard of care if they fail to adopt beneficial AI that most other
doctors have already accepted. One physician observer noted that
current medical malpractice law “incentivizes physicians to minimize
the potential value of AI,”257 saying that the safest way for physicians
to use AI to avoid liability is as a “confirmatory tool to support existing
decision-making processes, rather than as a source of ways to improve
care.”258 However, where AI use becomes mainstream, reluctant
physicians could end up on the wrong side of the standard of care for
widely adopted, clearly beneficial AI because “the failure to adopt and
use electronic technologies may establish a deviation from the standard
of care.”259
EMR and other AI clinical decision support systems “may reshape
medical liability by shifting the standard of care.”260 Doctors who decide
to vary treatment from AI-powered “clinical decision support guidelines
may represent a risk for malpractice liability based on a violation of
new standards of care.”261 Departure from the recommendations of an
EMR or other clinical decision support system could be used as evidence
of medical malpractice as a departure from the standard of care.262
Similarly, physicians could be protected from liability by following AI
recommendations—even if those recommendations are incorrect.263 If
the doctor supersedes or overrides the EMR’s default, the physician
may need to be prepared to defend that decision in court.264 If juries
rely too much on these EMR defaults, erroneous liability may be
assigned.265
Surgical robots also change the standard of care. Surgeons who
adopt robotic techniques early risk violating the standard of care if
robot-less surgeries clearly outperform robot-assisted procedures.
Similarly, surgeons who fail to adopt robotic techniques may violate the
standard of care once the robotic systems become widely accepted and
have better outcomes than non-robotic techniques.
Mitigation of damages caused by the robot and competent use of
AI are part of the standard of care. Surgeons do relinquish some control
257. Price et al., supra note 106, at 1765.
258. Id.
259. Paterick et al., supra note 233, at 559.
260. Id. at 560.
261. Id. at 559; Price et al., supra note 106, at 1766.
262. Paterick et al., supra note 233, at 559.
263. Price et al., supra note 106 (reviewing eight possible scenarios).
264. Paterick et al., supra note 233, at 560.
265. Id.
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during robotic surgery but maintain control over the robots and are
responsible for mitigating any damages a robot may cause during
surgery.266 For example, in a case involving the Da Vinci system, the
expert opined that “generally accepted standards [require] the operating
surgeon to identify [a puncture caused by the robot] and correct[] this
issue prior to completion of the surgery.”267
Surgeons must also maintain their surgical skills in traditional
techniques to mitigate damages when robots and computerized options
inevitably and foreseeably fail. This can be problematic when surgeons
are trained to only perform procedures using robot-assisted techniques.
For example, in a recent case, the da Vinci robot displayed multiple
“error” messages and neither the surgical team nor the company
representative was able to make the robot functional, so the surgeon
had to use “laparoscopic equipment instead of the robot for the
remainder of the surgery.”268 The patient suffered complications after
the robot malfunctioned that he alleged were due to the robot
malfunction and surgeon error.269 When a robot fails, a surgeon must
have maintained the skills necessary to finish the procedure without the
robot, which can become problematic if the surgeon has rarely, if ever,
performed the procedure without the robot. At some point, the
standard of care might become to abort the procedure until the robot
is repaired rather than risk complications by performing the procedure
in a way in which they are only vaguely familiar.
2.

Causation

As human and AI interactions are intertwined, proving causation
can become difficult for plaintiffs. In medical malpractice cases,
“causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability
based upon competent expert testimony” or a similar state law
standard.270 Causation must also be proven in products liability cases.
Specifically, in one surgical robot case, the “plaintiff was required to
prove that the manufacturer proximately caused the malfunction that
led to the injuries,” and thus, “prove that the machine, rather than the
doctor, caused the injury.”271 The plaintiff’s failure to prove proximate

266. Roe, supra note 14, at 330.
267. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213,
at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019).
268. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 363 F. App’x 925, 926 (3d Cir. 2010).
269. Id. (“One week later, Mracek suffered a gross hematuria and was
hospitalized. He now has erectile dysfunction, which he had not suffered
from prior to the surgery, and has severe groin pain.”).
270. Martinez v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01556-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 266213,
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2019).
271. Roe, supra note 14, at 332.
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causation by the manufacturer led to dismissal of the case.272 In a
medical malpractice case, the opposite would be true; for example, the
plaintiff would have to show that the doctor, and not the machine,
caused the damage. In AI cases, the intricate relationship between
human and machine exacerbate “the difficulty of proving causation,
especially when artificial intelligence and human oversight are
intertwined.”273 The entanglement of human versus machine liability
can “make a technical, factual determination of who [the doctor or the
AI device] was responsible” difficult for a jury and will require expert
testimony.274
3.

Damages

AI opens up the possibility of new types of damages in medicine.
For example, AI-enabled EMRs can provide patients and doctors with
the opportunity for “early advance care planning conversations,”275 and
eventually, failure to have these conversations may make physicians
liable for the consequences of patients dying without planning. Doctors
and patients have traditionally dealt with “[p]rognostic uncertainty and
optimism bias” that often leads “patients and clinicians to overestimate
life expectancy, which can delay important conversations.”276 In cancer
care, one of the key reasons for this deficiency is that “oncology
clinicians cannot accurately identify patients at risk of short-term
mortality using existing tools.”277 Therefore, “most patients with cancer
die without a documented conversation about their treatment goals and
end-of-life preferences and without the support of hospice care.”278
Today, however, AI-enabled EMRs can be used to “accurately
identify patients at high risk of short-term mortality in general medicine
settings,”279 which may give patients the opportunity for end-of-life
planning that previously may not have been possible. Today, “oncology
specific ML algorithms can accurately predict short-term mortality
among patients starting chemotherapy.”280 In a recent study, “ML
models based on structured EHR data accurately predicted the shortterm mortality risk of individuals with cancer from oncology

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 339.
275. Parikh et al., supra note 61, at 2.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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practices.”281 These tools “could be very useful in aiding clinicians’ risk
assessments for patients with cancer as well as serving as a point-ofcare prompt to consider discussions about goals and end-of-life
preferences.”282 Clinicians agreed that “most patients flagged . . . were
appropriate for a timely conversation about goals and end-of-life
preferences” suggesting that “ML tools hold promise for integration into
clinical workflows to ensure that patients with cancer have timely
conversations about their goals and values.”283
At some point, failure to provide these end-of-life discussions could
lead to damages for which physicians could become liable. As AI
proliferates throughout medicine, more novel damage theories will likely
become evident.
C.

Other Liability Theories

Other theories of liability are likely to include ordinary negligence
and breach of warranty. However, AI-related issues are likely to be
largely similar to law in other areas for these theories, so they are only
mentioned briefly here.
1.

Negligence by the Owner of the AI

The hospital or other owner of the AI system will have liability for
ordinary negligence for issues related to the proper care and
maintenance of the AI equipment.284 For example, in a recent case
involving the Mako total knee robot, the plaintiff alleged that the
hospital “failed in its duty owed plaintiff as the owner and custodian
responsible for ensuring the ‘proper care, maintenance and performance
of’ the Mako system.”285
Hospitals could also be liable for negligence for adopting impractical
and overly burdensome AI EMR systems. EMRs are creating liability
issues by compromising patient safety due to something one author
termed “death by a thousand clicks.”286 Physicians are being overloaded
with the task of creating and interpreting the EMR with “many doctors
281. Id. at 7.
282. Id. at 8.
283. Id. at 9.
284. See, e.g., Moll v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 13-6086, 2014 WL 1389652,
at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014) (suing Ochsner hospital under negligence
theories for “injuries sustained as the result of robot-assisted laparoscopic
hysterectomy.”).
285. Porter v. Stryker Corp., No. CV 6:19-0265, 2019 WL 3801635, at *1 (W.D.
La. Aug. 12, 2019).
286. Fred Schulte and Erika Frye, Death by a thousand clicks: Where
electronic health records went wrong, HEALTH LEADERS (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/innovation/death-thousand-clickswhere-electronic-health-records-went-wrong
[https://perma.cc/7VYGQEF9].
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say[ing] they spend half their day or more clicking pulldown menus and
typing rather than interacting with patients.”287 When hospitals
implement new EMR systems without adequate physician input and
training, foreseeable injuries may occur for which the hospital could be
liable under ordinary negligence theories. In addition, the hospital can
be liable for the doctor’s mistakes using its AI system under vicarious
liability theories even if the doctor is an independent contractor.288
In some cases, AI can even endanger hospital employees. For
example, one nurse recently filed a lawsuit including claims of
negligence and loss of consortium for a “traumatic brain injury”
allegedly suffered during her employment by a hospital when, “while
assisting during a surgery, [she] fell over a stool when the robotic arm
of a ‘da Vinci Surgical System’ . . . ’moved rapidly and unpredictably
toward her causing her to step back to avoid coming in contact with
it.’”289
2.

Breach of Warranty

Plaintiffs may allege breach of express and implied warranty.290 One
approach taken by a plaintiff in a robot case involved alleging that the
manufacturer’s “advertising and promotional materials ‘did not
accurately reflect the serious and potentially fatal side effects’” of the
AI.291 In another case, the doctors informed the patient that they would
use the da Vinci robot to minimize the chance of erectile dysfunction
associated with radical prostatectomy.292 The patient had allegedly
expressed concern over the potential complication and otherwise may
not have consented to the procedure without the robot, which may help
form the foundation for a case.293 The same standards that apply from

287. Id.
288. Roe, supra note 14, at 332 (noting ”[i]n addition to products liability, the
use of surgical robots also raises the question of vicarious liability”).
289. Patrico v. BJC Health Sys., No. 4:19-CV-01665-SNLJ, 2019 WL 3947781,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2019).
290. See, e.g., Reece v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Ala.
2014) (alleging breach of express and implied warranty, among other
claims).
291. Darringer v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-00300-RMW, 2015 WL
4623935, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2015).
292. Mracek v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402 (E.D. Pa.
2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 925 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the doctor
“informed [the plaintiff] that the da Vinci surgical robot (“robot”) would
be used for the radical prostatectomy, so as to minimize the risk of erectile
dysfunction.”).
293. Id.
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§402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts apply to breach of
warranty that apply to strict liability.294
3.

AI as a “Person”

Some futurists argue that “machines capable of independent
initiative and of making their own plans . . . are perhaps more
appropriately viewed as persons than machines,” and therefore, should
be subject to liability themselves.295 If machines are viewed as legal
persons, then the machine itself could be held liable and be required to
keep adequate insurance.296 However, as long as the machine can be
linked to a person or recognized legal entity, current product liability,
negligence, and medical malpractice laws are likely to suffice—so legal
recognition of machines as persons seems to be speculative and probably
unnecessary at this time.

Conclusion
Artificial intelligence is revolutionizing medical care while
simultaneously creating novel liability issues for providers and
manufacturers. By mimicking human intelligence using computer
algorithms that can learn from vast amounts of data, AI has the
potential to outperform human physicians. Virtual systems like EMR
and other clinical decision support systems augmented by AI are
already ubiquitous in health care systems. Physical systems like AIenabled robots are becoming more common in surgical procedures
ranging from total knee replacements to radical prostatectomies. AI is
showing promise to improve the care of patients with many different
types of diseases noted throughout this paper from Alzheimer’s disease
to heart attacks to sepsis, among others.
New technologies like AI are important drivers of liability risk. In
order to maximize the potential of AI, liability risks need to be defined
so that all parties understand their responsibilities and the legal
implications when technology inevitably causes harm. Current legal
frameworks for products liability, medical malpractice, and ordinary
negligence are likely to provide the foundation for liability analysis of
AI systems with some twists specific to AI. In products liability law,
the usual risks for design defects are present similar to other medical
products. Uniquely foreseeable AI-specific design risks include data
flaws, discrimination and bias, corruption and industry influence, userinterface issues, privacy compromise, and security issues, among others
that will develop as AI use increases.

294. See id. at 407.
295. Vladeck, supra note 183, at 122.
296. Id. at 129.
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Human touch, compassion, clinical intuition, and empathy are
important components of medical care that have led many to describe
medicine as an “art” as well as a science, so there will likely remain
many instances in which predominantly human medical care will
outperform AI-dominated care. However, AI is likely to play an
increasing role in medical decision-making going forward.
For many types of medical issues, new measures for when an AI
product is “not reasonably safe” will arise, and AI will likely be held to
a higher standard than humans alone as AI systems will be compared
to other AI systems and to manufacturer performance standards.
Expert testimony will be especially important in AI cases and will likely
represent a considerable barrier for many plaintiffs, as experts may be
scarce or unwilling to testify against their potential employers. AI
manufacturing defect liability will likely mirror that of other medical
devices. “Failure to warn” defects in AI cases will likely be based in
failure to train the end users, overpromising results, overly-steep
learning curves. At least one court has already concluded that an AI
system was “unavoidably unsafe.” Causation issues will play a role in
outcomes as juries will have to decide whether the physician or the AI
manufacturer was responsible for the plaintiff’s injury.
AI also affects medical malpractice liability by adding a complex
layer of issues like superseding causes and mitigation of damages. Wise
doctors will remain as important as ever in applying AI to medicine in
ways to maximize benefits to patients. AI will create new duties for
physicians to adopt and properly use AI as new technologies become
the prevailing standard of care. AI will move the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases with both early and late adapters potentially
facing liability issues.
AI will create new liability risks for doctors as it leads to more
discoverable evidence and the potential for information errors related
to the overwhelming amount of data, as well as the mixture of
erroneous/old data with correct/current information (e.g., copy and
paste errors) in medical records. EMR involvement in medical
malpractice cases tripled over the past decade and is likely to continue
to climb as EMR adoption becomes universal.
Doctors’ decisions to either follow or go against AI predictions will
have legal consequences. Doctors who are trained on AI and never learn
to practice without it may have difficulties when computers fail, which
could lead to liability issues if the doctor is not prepared to complete a
surgery, for instance, without a robot. Causation issues will likely play
a large role because it will be hard for juries to dissect liability when
physician responsibilities are so intertwined with AI systems. Again,
expert testimony will be key. AI also may create new areas of liability
where, for example, AI may allow doctors to warn patients prior to bad
events, so that patients can be better prepared for illness or end of life,
and failure to provide this information may lead to new areas of
damages (e.g., similar to loss of chance theories).

105

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
AI and Liability in Health Care

Other liability frameworks will also play a more conventional role
in AI-related claims, like ordinary negligence for maintenance and
repair of AI or breach of warranty claims. Current liability frameworks
are likely to suffice for AI systems in medicine, so it is unlikely that AI
will rise to the level of personhood in the law of liability. All parties
involved have unique responsibilities in dealing with AI. Manufacturers
must ensure data is good, algorithms valid, and systems
nondiscriminatory, in addition to ensuring the usual care in
manufacturing to avoid defect. Manufacturers must also make sure the
AI is not a black box and that end users are aware of its limitations
and potential flaws, as well as ensuring that the users are properly
trained to use their AI. Hospitals must properly maintain their AI and
make sure their employees are properly trained in its use. Doctors must
be the human interface between the technology and the patient by
analyzing context for AI outputs and continuing to provide the human
elements (e.g., compassion, empathy, clinical intuition) of good medical
practice. As outlined in this paper, existing legal frameworks should
provide the parties involved with AI’s proliferation reasonable ability
to anticipate liability issues so that AI continues to rapidly
revolutionize medical care.
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